On June 5, 2025, the US Supreme Court in a blockbuster unanimous decision, AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVICES, made it easier for “reverse discrimination”, also known as “majority” Plaintiffs to prevail in discrimination lawsuits. A “reverse discrimination” or “majority” plaintiff is a member of a group that historically has not been the target of ingrained cultural prejudices and discrimination against persons in that group.
In race and color discrimination claims, reverse discrimination or majority plaintiffs are individuals who are Caucasian or White; in ethnic origin discrimination claims, reverse discrimination or majority plaintiffs are individuals who were born in the United States of America; in sex discrimination claims, majority plaintiffs are males; in discrimination claims based on one’s sexual orientation, majority plaintiffs are individuals who are heterosexuals. In religious discrimination cases, majority plaintiffs are individuals who belong to the prevailing or dominant religious group within a particular workplace or community, and who allege discrimination based on their religious beliefs or practices.
When individuals now experience discrimination in the workplace because of being a member of a majority class, i.e., they are male, or heterosexual, Caucasian or White, or not belonging to the dominant religious group within their particular workplace; or in ethnic origin claims because they were born in the United States, they will have a better chance of proving the discrimination against them was because they are a member of such a majority class.
Prior to AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVICES, an employment discrimination plaintiff who was member of a majority group, had to satisfy a “background circumstances” rule which required members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Federal Title VII discrimination claim, which was not required of those who were not members of a majority group.
Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision bars employers from intentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e– 2(a)(1).
Background of case
Marlean Ames is a heterosexual woman, who worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. The agency interviewed her for a new management position in 2019, but hired another candidate who was a lesbian woman. The agency subsequently demoted Ames from her role as a program administrator and later hired a gay man to fill that role. Ames then filed lawsuit against the agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation of heterosexual. The District Court and Appeals Court held that because as a heterosexual she was a member of a majority class, she was required to, and did not meet, the higher evidentiary rule required for a plaintiff who is a member of a majority group, i.e., she did not show background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. The case wound its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court on June 5, 2025 overturned United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. According to the United States Court of Appeals, specifically, Ames had to show "background circumstances” to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 87 F.4th 822 (2023). The Appeals Courts stated that the necessary showing of "background circumstances" was the principal issue. Otherwise, Ames's prima-facie case was easy to make: her claim is based on sexual orientation, which is a protected ground under Title VII, she was demoted from her position and had held that position for five years, with reasonably good reviews; and she was replaced by a gay man. Moreover, after she applied for the Bureau Chief position and was denied the position, the Department chose a gay woman. The Appeals court stated whether Ames made the necessary showing of "background circumstances" was the principal issue in the matter. Otherwise, the Appeals court said that Ames's prima-facie case was easy to make: her claim is based on sexual orientation, which is a protected ground under Title VII. The Appeals Court ruled Ames failed to show background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.
The US Supreme Court threw out the requirement that in Title VII cases, majority member plaintiffs, such as Plaintiff Ames, had to show background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.
It stated that Title VII had been misapplied because the text of Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. The provision focuses on individuals, barring discrimination against “any individual” because of protected characteristics. Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined.
For those who would like to read in further detail on the Ames’ U.S. Supreme Court’s Opinion, selected excerpts from the opinion delivered by Justice Jackson are below:
JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Under our Title VII precedents, a plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing “that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 253 (1981).
he question in this case is whether, to satisfy that prima facie burden, a plaintiff who is a member of a majority group must also show “‘background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.’” 87 F. 4th 822, 825 (CA6 2023) (per curiam). We hold that this additional “background circumstances” requirement is not consistent with Title VII’s text or our case law construing the statute. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below and remand for application of the proper prima facie standard.
The Ohio Department of Youth Services operates the State’s juvenile correctional system. In 2004, the agency hired petitioner Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, to serve as an executive secretary. Ames was eventually promoted to program administrator and, in 2019, applied for a newly created management position in the agency’s Office of Quality and Improvement. Although the agency interviewed her for the position, it ultimately hired a different candidate—a lesbian woman—to fill the role.
A few days after Ames interviewed for the management position, her supervisors removed her from her role as program administrator. She accepted a demotion to the secretarial role she had held when she first joined the agency— a move that resulted in a significant pay cut. The agency then hired a gay man to fill the vacant program-administrator position. Ames subsequently filed this lawsuit against the agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation. .....
The court analyzed Ames’s claims under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), which establishes the traditional framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims that rest on circumstantial evidence. At the first step of that framework, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive. Relying on Circuit precedent, the District Court concluded that Ames had failed to make that showing because she had not presented evidence of “‘background circumstances’” suggesting that the agency was the rare employer who discriminates against members of a majority group. ..... Without that evidence, the court held, plaintiffs who are members of majority groups—including heterosexual plaintiffs, like Ames—could not discharge their evidentiary burden at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry. ........
Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision bars employers from intentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). In McDonnell Douglas, this Court laid out a three-step burden-shifting framework for evaluating claims arising under that provision. 411 U. S., at 802–804. The McDonnell Douglas framework aims to “bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate question” in a disparate-treatment case— namely, whether “the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” .....
At the first step of the familiar three-step inquiry, the plaintiff bears the “initial burden” of “establishing a prima facie case” by producing enough evidence to support an inference of discriminatory motive. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 802. If the plaintiff clears that hurdle, the burden then “shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Ibid. Finally, if the employer articulates such a justification, the plaintiff must then have a “fair opportunity” to show that the stated justification “was in fact pretext” for discrimination. Id., at 804. A plaintiff “may succeed [under the McDonnell Douglas framework] either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”
For most plaintiffs, the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework—the prima facie burden—is “not onerous.” .............A plaintiff may satisfy it simply by presenting evidence “that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.’” …… the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or our longstanding precedents. And nothing Ohio has said, in its brief or at oral argument, persuades us otherwise. .....
As a textual matter, Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. Rather, the provision makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” By establishing the same protections for every “individual”—without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group—Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone...
The Sixth Circuit has implemented a rule that requires certain Title VII plaintiffs—those who are members of majority groups—to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard in order to carry their burden under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. We conclude that Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority group plaintiffs. Therefore, the judgment below is vacated, and the case is remanded for application of the proper prima facie standard.
It is so ordered.
End of excerpts.
Don’t sit on your rights. If you resign, you may lose right to prevail in a lawsuit.
At times, unsavvy employers will issue harsh unjustified employee evaluations in an attempt to pressure the employee into resigning. See Employee Performance Evaluations. In many instances of discrimination, see New Jersey Race Discrimination Lawyer, if you resign, you may lose right to prevail in a lawsuit unless you first take certain legally required measures to preserve your job while you are still employed. If you are thinking of resigning, or think you will be fired, or have been fired, you should contact this office immediately for a free consultation to discuss your options in the safest way for you. See New Jersey Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lawyer.
What You Can Do.
If you are being subjected to unlawful workplace discrimination and/or were fired, contact Hope A. Lang, Attorney at Law today for a free consultation. I have represented numerous employees who were discriminated against and I was successful in recovering multiple six-figure financial compensation for their emotional pain and suffering, and moneys for lost wages, both for past lost wages and projected future lost wages. I accept cases from all over New Jersey and have locations in Southern, Central and Northern NJ to meet with clients.
Hope A. Lang, Attorney at Law represents workers throughout the entire state, including Hackensack, Jersey City, Newark, Irvington, Orange, East Orange, Trenton, Paterson, Montclair, Elizabeth, North Brunswick, Cherry Hill, Vineland, Union, Plainfield, Hamilton Township, Lakewood, Edison, Parsippany-Troy Hills, Franklin, Lakewood, and every NJ County, including Bergen, Hudson, Middlesex, Essex, Monmouth, Somerset, Ocean, Union, Camden, Passaic, Morris, Gloucester, Atlantic, Burlington, Camden Counties.